Capital Flight Working Project

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Browsing Capital Flight Working Project by Subject "sub-Saharan Africa"

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    Capital Flight: Measurement and Drivers
    (AERC, 2014-09) Ndikumana, Léonce; . Boyce, James K; Ndiaye, Ameth Saloum
    This paper describes the nature of capital flight, the methodologies used to measure it, and its drivers. The paper presents updated estimates of the magnitude of capital flight from 39 African countries for which adequate data are available for the period 1970-2010. It gives a global context of the problem of capital flight from Africa by providing comparative indicators on capital flight and related flows for other developing regions. The paper undertakes a detailed econometric analysis of the drivers of capital flight from African countries. It explores empirically the role of domestic and external factors in driving capital flight, including structural factors, the macroeconomic environment, governance, risk and returns to investment, capital account openness, and financial development. The first objective of the study is to contribute to the literature by providing the most comprehensive analysis of capital flight from Africa that takes into account economic as well as non-economic dimensions and recognizes the importance of both the domestic and global contexts. The second objective is to contribute to the policy debate on capital flight both in Africa and globally.
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    GOVERNANCE AND ILLICIT FINANCIAL FLOWS*
    (AERC, 2014-09-01) Ayogu, Melvin D; Gbadebo-Smith, Folarin
    Insofar that it corrodes governance, engendering opportunistic crimes, grand corruption lies at the core of the problem of illicit financial flows. We identify at least two likely antagonistic circles in the illicit flow process—a virtuous circle and a vicious circle—both rooted in one common factor, namely, the strategic complementarity between corruption and governance. Also, we consider the scope of global governance architecture in encouraging banks to “do the crime, pay the fine, and do no time.” Given this structure, the observed, rampant impudence of banks’ participation in illicit financial flows is understandable and society would not be shocked should global mega-banks increasingly resemble a police establishment run by ex-convicts. Curbing illicit flows in such a circumstance would be daunting. Therefore, civil society must live up to its civic responsibilities by displacing the vicious cycle first through creating the right incentives for politicians to identify negatively with illicit financial flows.